.
I wasn’t
too familiar with his works beforehand and I really enjoyed learning a bit more
of his approach to economics. Some of the data usage, especially his simulation
program MINSKY was beyond me, though. Nevertheless I found some interesting
points in his talk.
He’s a
heterodox economist, very fond of attacking the neoclassical consensus, which
is also his focus. For instance he made a splendid explanation for how certain
models used in conventional micro economics (Perfect Competition; Indifference
curves; Demand Curve Aggregation) are
not only unrealistic but also internally incoherent. This was refreshing, as
was his pounding away at the “Money Neutrality” idea in macro. Neoclassical
economics normally argue that money is neutral in transactions going on in the
economy, i.e. money is the common denominator of heterogeneous goods and
services simplifying exchange of these goods and services, but that it doesn’t
impact the transaction itself. However, it also argues that money is just a number,
and what matters is the ratio between
the values of goods. The prime example is, if the money supply would double
overnight and everyone suddenly would have twice the amount of money they had
yesterday, neoclassicals say this won’t affect the economy because prices would
also double, maintaining relative prices as they were before. This is one of the reason they see inflation as harmless.
That is of
course mistaken, as money supply increases doesn't happen that way; they flow through the economy from bank lending and
(artificial) credit expansion, where some groups access those new money before
other groups do – also, as Keen pointed out, we consume predominantly out of
habit, habits used to certain numbers for certain goods. Even if I suddenly
have access to twice as much money on paper, I might still hesitate before
buying goods of twice its “normal” price, regardless of the rational approach such an action would entail.
On the disappointing
side was more profound issues in the approach to economics. There was a comment
from the audience saying that economics is unscientific when it uses a priori axioms, suggesting its methodology should mirror the hard sciences.
Surprisingly, Keen agreed, and added that he doesn’t view economics as a
science – rather a discipline. Perhaps a mere tautology, but it is ironic to the
point of laughter, when he ten minutes earlier praised the usage of mathematics
in economics.
That’s funny, Professor: see, mathematics is a science that solely uses a priori axioms, just like geometry or logic. Demote a science on the basis of incorrect methodology is an adequate critique, but then it should be held consistently, even to "your own" sciences.
I don't think Keen is actually placing these disciplines in the same
category of “unscientific academia” as economics, but that's what his comment yesterday implied. On the contrary, and this is
a point over which Austrians and Neoclassicals fight, you have to use a priori axioms in economics, or else you’re fumbling
in the dark. The Economy is us. We are always changing, reacting to new conditions and information. Thus, contrary events can occur simultaneously. If you disregards
a priori axioms and only rely on data collection like in the hard sciences, you
might have instances where these events cancel out, or even produce a reverse effect, leading the scientist to mindless conclusions. Since economics involve people's actions, which are prone to change at whims and desires, we cannot simply observe data and draw conclusions from those, such as a biologist would. Keen's claim is nonsense.
That leads
me to the second disappointment in Keen’s approach. He’s firmly dedicated on
using data, putting into his MINSKY simulation, yielding predictions and
explanation of how the economy would work given certain inputs. Again mistaken
on his own grounds; people are not “chess men you move on a board”, (to quote the Keynes vs Hayek rap video), "their dreams and desires ignored". Believing that you can map every event in future
economic conditions smells of the same convictions Hayek viciously attacked in
his Nobel Lecture Pretense of Knowledge in 1974. I thought we were past that...
Murphy and Callahan, back in 2001 when Murphy was still at NYU, added several striking
critiques to Keen’s work in their review, for instance about labour economics.
Keen does an excellent job taking down the labour theory of value, then turns
around and constructs a “real price theory of value”, falling in the same
Marxian trap of ignoring the subjectivity of costs.
A great way to start the semester – I really hope for more occasions
to discuss the essence of economics.
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